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Abstract	
We analyse the political and military bargaining between Japan and the U.S. from 1905 to 1941, using 
game theory concepts. We conclude that the outcome of the Washington Naval Limitation Meeting was 
not Nash equilibrium since Japan had an incentive to deviate. After the war in Europe began, the U.S. 
seemed to begin an anti-Germany war. The decision-making process in Japan during that period could 
be viewed as a mini-max principle. We formulate a three-period game corresponding to historical 
evidence. In this game, the loss of Japan is minimized when Japan declares war on the U.S. in the 
second period since the ratio of Japanese naval power to that of the U.S. was maximized in that period.  
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１． Introduction 
 
     We analyze the political and military bargaining between Japan and the U.S. from 1905 to 
1941, using game theory concepts.  The decision-making process in Japan during that period could 
be viewed as a mini-max principle. 
The behaviour of Japan was affected by an action of the world situation and the United States in 
particular. We cannot evaluate the behaviour of Japan appropriately by watching only Japan. In 
that period, most areas of Asia and Africa were assumed a colony of the European and American 
Great Powers. 
     The United States was expanding frontier from the East Coast of the North American 
Continent, and the intention that stretched out a sphere of influence to the west in the Pacific was 
clearer after having reached the West Coast. After having annexed Hawaii in 1898, there was the 
intention of the entry to the China market and insisted on an open-door policy in 1899. 
Furthermore, I possessed the Philippines in 1901 and placed it under power. After Russo-Japanese 
War of 1905, the United States assumed Japan a hypothetical enemy. Therefore, it is thought that a 
diagram called the opposition with an American world strategy around the west Pacific and the 
strategy of the Japanese independence maintenance for it became clearer after it. The absolute anti-
Japanese sentiment Immigration Act based on the racial discrimination was passed in 1924 and 
expelled a Japanese emigrant. In response to the Great Depression of 1929, the Hawley=Smoot 
Tariff Act, which imposes the duty more than a maximum of 800% on an import fortune is passed 
and will have a big influence on Japanese economy. Furthermore, a Great War outbreak in Europe 
of September, 1939 has a big influence on the policy of both Japan and the United States. 
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We consider the bargaining process between Japan and the United States while considering the 
difference in both political system and economic situation in such a frame. A series of movement 
of the two countries or the strategy divide it into some categories and can think. The first relates to 
economic activities and includes the Hawley=Smoot Tariff Act or an oil embargo. The second 
relates to naval armaments and is Washington disarmament treaty and withdrawal of Japan, navy 
expansion plan for it of America. The third relates to the international relations for the country 
except Japan and the United States, such as Japan, Germany and Italy Triple Alliance. In addition, 
we know that the strategic choice that Japan can take has been narrowed rapidly because a cabinet 
changes frequently in Japan. Furthermore, it is thought that a new cabinet played a sub game in the 
choice of the extremely limited strategy under the new strategy of the United States for the strategy 
of the predecessor because the supreme command department of army and navy was not the 
system which a consistent policy has stolen. 
 
2.  Economic relations 
 
2-1.The change of the U. S. diplomatic policy to Japan after the Russo-Japanese War 
      The Russo-Japanese War from 1904 through 05 terminated by the conclusion of the 
Portsmouth treaty of September 5, 1905 by the intermediation of President American Theodore 
Roosevelt. 
      Edward Henry Harriman, who was an American railroad baron, wanted to make Japan and the 
United States syndicate, for the south Manchurian railroad which Japan would run by Portsmouth 
treaty, and he offered it. It is the suggestion of the partnership. For this suggestion, the Prime 
Minister Taro Katsura, Kaoru Inoue or Shibusawa Eiichi and others on behalf of the financial 
world agreed, too, and the memorandum of the preliminary agreement was exchanged on October 
12, 1905. It may be said that the partnership with the American company of the south Manchurian 
railroad was extremely realistic choice for Japan which became impoverished financially militarily 
just after the Russo-Japanese War. In addition, it was equal with the American national interest 
that fell behind other Great Powers while aiming at an advance to Mainland China. However, 
Jutaro Komura, who compiled Portsmouth treaty as Japanese side full power and, went back to my 
own country, and returned to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on October 15, objected strongly for 
this suggestion. The grounds were things not to be able to sell Manchurian that I obtained by the 
blood of Japanese officers to the United States, and in a sense it was a just argument, but it was 
expected that Japanese Government cancel a memorandum bound together once one-sidedly on 
October 25. After this, the American strategy that aimed at the entry to the continent market to 
Japan comes to assume change, Japan a hypothetical enemy. 
 
2-2    Racial discrimination policies and the anti-Japanese sentiment Immigration Act  
     One of the basic institutional characteristics to characterize the global community until the early 
20th century includes the racial discrimination policy that has been taken openly in European and 
American society. These are not things of the kinds such as personal prejudice and feelings; in a 
public thing such as a law and a policy of one country or the judicial decision. 
      Japan participated in World War I that broke out in 1914 as the allied powers side by a Japan-
Britain alliance, and the allied powers side increased the United States from 1917. 
      In a peace conference after World War I started in January, 1919, Japan planned to insert the 
principle of racial equality in League of Nations agreement above sentence or league agreement 
Article 21 to guarantee religious liberty. In contrast, Australia with "federal emigration limit law" 
to limit the emigrant of the coloured race objects in various form strongly, and Japan gives up the 
insertion of "the racial equality". And Japan suggested that "We approved principles of the fairness 
service for the equality of each nation and the nation" and inserted the phrase in the League of 
Nations agreement above sentence in the place of the meeting in the League of Nations Committee 
last of April 11, 1919. Though there were more agreement 11, objection 5 and agreeable countries, 
President Wilson which was the chairperson should decide such an important thing not decision by 
majority unanimously and, for this suggestion, smashed this plan.  
     In addition, the American Supreme Court performed the judgment "that the yellow-skinned 
races could not be naturalized and were a foreigner, and the naturalization right did not have" in 
1922 and deprived it to the Japanese right that I was already naturalized in. This is measures by the 
subsequent law that must not be a modern constitutional state. Furthermore, "the absolute anti-
Japanese sentiment Immigration Act" to expel a Japanese emigrant is passed in 1924. This law is 
the federal law whereas a previous anti-Japanese sentiment law was a state law.  
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2-3.   Block economization as the correspondence to the Great Depression and autarky 
     When the Great Depression occur in 1929, the Hawley=Smoot Tariff Act, which imposed the 
duty more than 800%passed an assembly to import fortunes more than 1,000 items in the United 
States and the President signed it in 1930, the following day and was established. 
 In addition, the U.K. makes a duty that there few it between the colony in Ottawa meeting (Ottawa 
Agreements) in 1932, but decides that I hang a high duty for the outside the area. It is said that this 
did collapse and the block economization of the free trade system conclusively. 
     It is thought that there were such situation and "the absolute anti-Japanese sentiment 
Immigration Act" in one of the backgrounds of Manchurian Incident of 1931 and the Manchurian 
country establishment of 1932. 
     The disposal of "treaty of commerce and navigation" is given notice of from the United States 
in July, 1939. The Hawley=Smoot Tariff Act largely limited import from Japan, but the disposal of 
this "treaty of commerce and navigation" meant that I did not sell important resources for Japan. 
The U.K. and the Netherlands follow in 1941 two years later. Japan will in this way lack in raw 
materials necessary for modern industry such as iron, tin, aluminium, wool, the rubber 
conclusively. Furthermore, 80% imported the oil in those days from the United States, and, in Arab 
countries which were other main oil production area, Malay Peninsula, North Borneo, the British 
follower, Indonesia were under the control of the Netherlands. 
     On July 25, 1941, the United States freezes Japanese assets residing in the United States, and 
Japan starts stationing in a southern Buddha mark (Vietnam) on July 28, and the United States 
embargos oil entirely for Japan on August 1. This means that the Japanese armaments become zero 
virtually in 1~2 years losing storage of the oil. 
 
3.   Navy disarmament conference 
 
3-1 Washington meeting 
       Based on overheat of the-based warship competition by the major country navy, during World 
War I and post-war period, the United States suggested the holding of the disarmament conference 
in Washington to each country in 1922. 
     As a result of meeting, a disarmament treaty was concluded, and, as for the U.K., the United 
States, Japan, France, the possession ratio of the capital ship including the Italian battleship, it was 
decided 5, 5, 3, 1.75, 1.75, to cancel the building of the capital ship again for the next ten years. In 
other words, the capital ship possession ratio in Japan became 60% to U.S. 
      In addition, it was determined to hold a meeting after having passed after treaty effect outbreak 
in eight years to accept the tendency of the times and technical progress. 
 
3-2 London meeting 
        London meeting was held in 1930 eight years later by the rule of the Washington meeting. 
The chief end of this meeting was a limit of the quantity of possession of the war vessel except the 
major ship including cruiser, destroyer and submarine, and re-extension for a capital ship building 
interval decided in Washington meeting. As a result, the ratio of the quantity of possession of 
Japan to U.S. was 60% for battleships and aircraft carriers, and was 64.3% as the whole.  
      It was thought that the force in the sea was proportional to square of the quantity of main war 
vessel possession such as battleships in those days. Therefore, the naval war vessel which Japan 
held was 60% to U.S., and it was to U.S 36%, and that the Japanese navy force could not 
responsible in the national defense. If it was 70%, it became 49% and thought that the Japanese 
Navy could permit it, so that they insisted on 70% to U.S. strongly. It was said that Japan could 
maintain American 70% that was a permission standard for the navy by the then strength of a 
nation if the United States did not change quantity of war vessel possession. Hence the 
Washington Convention was not a Nash equilibrium, and it was not stable in that sense.  
 
3-3.    The issue of supreme command dried criminal 
      The person in charge of the disarmament treaty conclusion in the London meeting was Prime 
Minister Osachi Hamaguchi, but, as the thing which performed a dried conviction of "the supreme 
command" that this conclusion was prescribed by Great Japanese Imperial Constitution Article 11 
and Article 12, was politicized. In other words, armaments are problems of the supreme command, 
and the authority to decide it in the cabinet which does not have the supreme command under 
Great Japanese Imperial Constitution is the claim that there is not. In the case of the decision 
making as the Japanese nation, I brought big influence, and, as for this "supreme command dried 
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criminal" problem, it followed that I often lacked in the consistency with diplomacy and military 
affairs afterwards. 
     Actually, because possession of 70% was not accepted, Japan withdrew from a disarmament 
conference and was going to maintain quantity of war vessel possession than 70% to U.S. 
However, it was feasible under the premise that the U. S. did not change a strategy, and was not 
possible to maintain the numerical value, when it was not so. Japan would take the wrong 
prediction about the United States changing the strategy here. If the United States did not change a 
conventional strategy, Japan should have been able to maintain quantity of war vessel possession 
more than 70% to U.S. However, in a sense, as a matter of course, the United States changes the 
strategy for Japan having changed a strategy. It is "The third Vinson plan" and “Two-Ocean Navy 
Act" which were established in 1940. 
      A time limit of the Washington Convention expires by withdrawal of Japan at the end of 1936. 
For "The third Vinson plan" and “Two-Ocean Navy Act", the expectation of the force ratio by the 
Japanese navy Naval General Staff was 75% in 1941, less than 50% in 1943 and less than 30% in 
1944. Therefore, the choice is extremely limited when we think about a sub game after the 
disarmament conference withdrawal, and it may be said that the navy authorities recognized that a 
difference enlarges after 1941. But this means that navy couldn't but admit that a prediction of the 
Japanese Navy about the American correspondence that became the basis of the judgment to 
withdraw from a disarmament conference took the wrong it. 
      This " Two-Ocean Navy Act " established in July, 1940 was the contents which could not 
possibly cope by the strength of a nation of then Japan with a thing to make 35 battleships, carrier 
20, warplane 25,000 by 1946. 
 
4.  Relations with other countries   
 
      Triple Alliance among Germany and Italy was concluded in September, 1940 one year after the 
Great War outbreak in Europe of 1939. German military predominance continued in those days in 
Europe. However, Germany persecuted a Jew as a national policy, and it followed that I worsened 
the feelings of the United States nation that large number of influential Jewish nations existed 
including economy in many fields to Japan more. 
     Actually, the United States gives an export of scrap iron restrictions law for Japan in October, 
1940 just after the Triple Alliance among Germany and Italy conclusion. 
     The U.K. which was numerical inferiority wanted to let the United States participate in the own 
country side somehow militarily. In such situation, President Franklin Roosevelt broadcasts virtual 
war intervention on a radio for all nations on December 29, 1940. Furthermore, the United States 
devises "the rainbow 5 plan" that is a strategic plan to Japan on March 27, 1941. 
      The U.K. and the Netherlands followed economic sanctions measures by the United States to 
Japan in July, 1941 and, including the Republic of China which was in a battle state, were called 
ABCD (America, Britain, China, Dutch)encircling. 
     On October 2, 1941, Hull notebook is taken out. This content is done with virtual final note to 
depend of America with a thing in defiance of a past negotiations process. 
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 Figure 2. 
 
 
5.   The bargaining process after the Great War outbreak in Europe 
 
5-1.   The situation of the United States 
      Because they can expect the effect of the effective demand promotion by the preparations for 
war reinforcement without there being the strong request from the U.K. after World War II 
outbreak in Europe of September, 1939, and getting rid of the Great Depression that began 
domestically from 1929, it is thought that President Franklin Roosevelt aimed at the outbreak of 
war with Germany. 
      For the United States which insisted on an open-door policy in 1899, it might be said that an 
entry to the China market was the problem that was important as Great Depression measures as the 
large increase of the demand for the war industry was an extremely effective policy for Great 
Depression conquest, and having mentioned above again for the United States troubled with the 
high unemployment rate while being blessed with natural resources such as oil or iron. 
The President in the United States is a chief executive of army and navy having the appointive 
power of all cabinet ministers. He can take a continuously stability-like policy after a presidential 
election for four years and become able to perform consistent diplomacy and military campaign. 
This is the point that is different from the Japanese political system conclusively in that period. 
Generally, it is extremely difficult for a politician to take a policy against campaign pledge. The 
declaration of war from the own country is against campaign pledge of 1940 of President 
Roosevelt, and it is disadvantageous politically, and the feasibility is low. In addition, even the 
President has difficulty in participation in a war in the form in defiance of public opinion because 
the approval of the assembly is necessary for declaration of war, and public opinion has big 
influence. I turned radiobroadcast to declare virtual intervention for the war in Europe on 
December 29, 1940 to all nations, but there is a gulf for a reaction of the public opinion in really 
dispatching troops with exporting weapons and the staff for battles. 
      However, there was Triple Alliance among Germany and Italy signed in September, 1940, and 
the participation in a war to Europe is justified if declared war against by Japan. But because 
Germany was not to declare war against it at the same time even if Japan declared war against the 
United States as for Triple Alliance among Germany and Italy, it did not mean that he could 
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participate in Europe automatically, but war-weariness-like public opinion in the United States was 
big, and it was expected that he moved. 
     On the other hand, it was the United States with the big strength of a nation potentially, but 
suitable time is necessary for war preparation, and what he participate in promptly is undesirable. 
After having put some run-up when I take these into consideration, a battle state begins in form 
scored the first by Japan, and it is thought that it was the development that is the most desirable for 
the Roosevelt government to enter the Great War with the approval of the assembly which stood 
on it. 
 
5-2.    The situation of Japan 
      Because the national economy receives a serious blow, and an emigrant to the United States 
was done with impossibility in the other by Hawley=Smoot Tariff Act passed just after Great 
Depression outbreak of 1929 as having mentioned above, a large quantity of unemployed people 
will occur. 
      The disposal of "Treaty of Commerce and Navigation" given notice of from the United States 
in July, 1939 just before the Great War outbreak in Europe meant that the import of indispensable 
important resources extremely became difficult as iron, tin, aluminium, wool, a modern nation 
including the rubber for Japan. Furthermore, after August, 1941, oil import from the United States 
which occupied 80% of the oil consumption of Japan was prohibited, and it was concerned about 
dwindling for the force economically. 
      The biggest characteristic in then Japan is that "The Supreme Command" became independent 
when we think about the decision-making mechanism as the nation. In other words, the supreme 
command which was the order right in military affairs became independent from the cabinet. 
Therefore it is extremely difficult to take diplomacy and military consistency and will often 
receive criticism with the double standard from the foreign country. 
      The cabinet changed frequently, too and lacked in consistency, the consistency of the policy 
with a diplomatic aspect. Furthermore, it was extremely difficult to keep a foreign policy and the 
consistency of the military campaign by independence of the supreme command which we stated 
above. Therefore, in each cabinet, it is thought even if they played a sub game in a certain situation 
given beyond own responsibility. It is a big difference with United States where it was able to have 
policy-like consistency toward or Germany. It may be said that this shows that it was in a far state 
with "the conspiracy" in Japan accused at Tokyo trial. 
      In addition, unlike the United States or Germany and the Soviet Union, we do not hit it in the 
organization system, which integrate the navy with the army and can apply. Ministry of  Defense 
which it was the organization which stood side by side, and the army and the navy moved in an 
original budget and the chain of command on the personnel affairs system and strategy side, and 
integrated them or the organization corresponding to the Department of Defense did not exist. 
      Furthermore, in army and each naval, military administration and a military command isolate 
it. The military administration is a thing in charge of a budget and personnel affairs side, and a 
person in charge is the Secretary of State for War who is the member of the cabinet and a Minister 
of the Navy. On the other hand, the military command is a thing in charge of the use on the 
military affairs side, and a person in charge is the staff officer president in the army and is the 
Naval General Staff president in the navy. They were not able to interfere it not the thing which 
belonged to the cabinet mutually again. 
      When time passed after Washington disarmament conference withdrawal about the armaments 
to some extent by American the third Vinson idea and Two-Ocean Navy Act , which mentioned 
above, it was thought that the force difference opened so that time stood by a Japan-U.S. economic 
power difference after it. Japan among the seas may receive an attack tactically from anywhere, 
and it is extremely disadvantageous to receive the initiative from the other countries, and the 
declaration of war from the own country is advantageous tactically. 
      In addition, it is thought that there was the repulsion for having received institutional racial 
discrimination in the background in the global community of many civilians having supported the 
outbreak of war including people called an intellectual, the cultured person as well as some 
officers. Iwata (2015) points out that "a personal grudge" to be hard to permit an insult for oneself 
changed to "moral indignation" for the system itself. 
      According to Yoshida (1983), Osami Nagano who was the Naval General Staff president 
performs the following situation recognition with a statement book in September, 1941. 
     The armaments in the Far East of America make progress very much in late 1942, and 
correspondence becomes the difficult situation. The United States extremely has many good 
chances to be reflected on a long-term strategy from a beginning. The war end is difficult and is 
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expected even if Japan wins by a short-term decisive battle when I move to long war. I conclude it 
to be considering what I score the first from Japan, the weather of the (3) field of operations 
without being opened the scoring from deciding the outbreak of war judging from the fact of the 
(1) force immediately, the (2) United States by such recognition. 
      He remained in a tactical level in conclusion, and distinction of "a strategy" and "the war" was 
not done definitely while he did wider situation recognition in this statement book, but it may be 
said that these contents became the basic policy of the policy in afterward.  
      It is thought that the then Japanese leader particularly the navy had a strategic idea based on the 
mini-max principle when they took these into consideration. In other words, they assumed always 
the worst situation fetching a declaration of war by the United States or the action that was almost 
it virtually for, and that they chose a strategy (outbreak of war time) that there were the fewest 
losses on the premise. The grounds of the judgment are the war vessel possession ratios after the 
disarmament conference withdrawal, and quantity of storage of the oil increases after the oil 
embargo by the United States. On the other hand, Japan did not understand importance of the 
campaign pledge in the decision making process of America and obtains it for fear of the United 
States opening the scoring.  
 
6.   Formulation as three-stage game 
 
6-1.   Influence of the hours progress 
       Based on these facts and the situation in the rear, I consider time until about 1944 as the 
development form game that I divided into three stages after a Great War outbreak in Europe of 
September, 1939. The first stage corresponds to the period from 1939 to September, 1940, when 
Triple Alliance among Germany and Italy was signed.  The second stage corresponds to the period 
from October, 1940 to 1942.  The third stage corresponds to the period after 1943 when a war 
vessel started work by the third Vinson plan was completed. Each country has two choices, 
continuing negotiations without opening the scoring and opening the scoring.  
      The major ships possession ratio was 60% to U.S. under Washington Convention in the 
Operation.  Japanese Naval General Staff section predicted it with 75% in late 1941, in less than 
50% in 1943, and less than 30% in 1944.   
      It is thought that the gain is high so that a statement book of Nagano has it about the initiative 
influence because to score the first becomes advantageous to Japan tactically, and the political 
difficulty by what we score the first again in the country is unlikely to produce it than it is scored 
the first in which point in time in the first half. 
     On the other hand, it is thought that to score the first in which point in time is low in the gain 
because the United States has a big political difficulty to be against the campaign pledge of the 
President, and it is expected that the military loss when it was opened the scoring is restrictive. 
  
6-2.    Illustration of the payoff 
     During negotiations continuation, we assume payoffs of both Japan and the United States are 
zero, and the Japanese payoff after the outbreak of war is negative and the American payoff is 
positive. 
      For Japan, the payoff is the highest in the second stage when the force difference between 
Japan and the United States is minimized, and the payoff is the lowest in the third stage when a 
force difference opens at an increasing tempo by the third Vinson plan and Two Ocean Navy Act. 
     On the other hand, for the United States, the payoff is the lowest in the second stage when the 
force difference between Japan and the United States is minimized, and the payoff is the highest in 
the third stage when a force difference opens at an increasing tempo by the third Vinson plan and 
Two Ocean Navy Act. 
     From a tactical advantage, the payoff of Japan is higher when it is opening the scoring first.  
The payoff of the U.S. is higher when Japan opens the scoring from a political reason. 
      The first stage is during Japan-U.S. negotiations continuation, and the U.S. side is less likely to 
receive the initiative again because preparations for war are not set. The Japan side is a half-cock, 
too. 
     In the second stage, the force difference between Japan and the United States in the Pacific is 
minimized. Japan does not want to carry over outbreak of war decision in the third stage when a 
force difference spreads with time. Assuming the short-term tactical victory by Japan opening the 
scoring, the room for peace negotiation under conditions of the suitability is left. 
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     In the third stage, the strategic difference spreads with time, and the damage when Japan 
received the initiative is serious. Storage such as the oil disappears, and the possibility of 
advantageous negotiations is extremely low. 
     Let JOtU and ADtU  denote the payoff of Japan and the U.S. respectively when Japan 
opens the scoring in the t stage.  And let JDtU  and AOtU  denote the payoff of Japan and 
the U.S. respectively when the U.S. opens the scoring in the t stage.  According to the 
previous discussion, the payoffs of Japan seem to satisfy the following condition. 
       JDJDJDJOJOJO UUUUUU 312312   
And the payoffs of the U.S. seem to satisfy the following condition. 
            
AOAOAOADADAD UUUUUU 213213        We exemplify a payoff list to meet these conditions in Figure 2.  
 
 
 Figure 2 
 
    It is thought that it has suitable rationality to open the scoring to the second if we think that 
Japan faced such a sub game. But we do not consider it about the payoff when in this case Japan 
received a demand of the U.S. in acknowledgment of Hull note overall. 
 
 
7.      Concluding remarks 
 
      It may be said that Japan driven into economically by "absolute anti-Japanese sentiment 
Immigration Act" establishment of 1924 in the United States, by Hawley=Smoot Tariff Act 
establishment of 1930. And by denunciation of "The Treaty of commerce and navigation" in July 
1939, Japan was extremely limited to the choice at the time of a Great War outbreak in Europe in 
September, 1939 as an industry nation in modern times. 
      On the other hand, in the Washington disarmament conference that prescribed the navy 
armaments of the major country, the quantity of main war vessel possession of Japan was 60% of 
the U.S. When Japan was suppressed in 60%, the Japanese Navy understood this, and it followed 
that I withdrew, on the contrary, to have suppressed the United States in 167% because I was not 
able to understand it. The situation after the Washington disarmament conference was not Nash 
equilibrium in this sense. 
        If the United States did not change a strategy after disarmament conference withdrawal, 
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Japanese Navy thought that Japan could maintain 70% to U.S., but, as a matter of course, the 
United States changed a strategy. Therefore, judging from a military aspect, it became that the 
Japanese choice was limited. 
        Japan misunderstood about the intention of the U.S. after the Great War outbreak in Europe. 
In addition, analysis about the authority of the assembly about the meaning of the pledge in the 
U.S. political system particularly the presidential election and diplomacy, military affairs was 
insufficient. Therefore, the payoff that Japan assumed was not necessarily the thing which 
reflected reality precisely. Therefore Japan mistook reactions of the U.S. at some important stages. 
      The choice for Japan was extremely restrictive, and, after an oil embargo by the United States, 
it was thought that the strength of a nation difference between Japan and the United States was 
enlarged at an increasing tempo with progress of the time. As for the armaments ratio in Japan to 
U.S., 1941 will take 75% of maximums. In such situation, it may be said that Japan took the action 
based on mini-max principle. It may be said that the declaration of war from Japan at the end of 
1941 when Wood(2007) points it out when decided based on "the accurate calculation of the 
military risk" was a mini-max strategy in the sub game there if Japan thinks that the outbreak of 
war to U.S. is not avoided. But it may not be said that an action after the outbreak of war of Japan 
was based on military rationality. 
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